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Book Review
INTRODUCTION TO LAW, LEGAL PROCESS AND PROCEDURE. CASES AND MATERIALS. By CorneliusF. Murphy,

Jr.t St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1977. Pp. 772.
Considerable uniformity exists among the first year curricula of
American law schools. Torts, contracts, property, and civil procedure claim almost total adherence while continuing ambivalence
characterizes the choice between constitutional law and criminal
law for the fifth slot. But, there is a wide variation with respect to
a frequent sixth course purporting to introduce students to the law
without specific uniform subject content. It has been variously entitled: legal method, legal history, legal process, judicial process, introduction to law, etc. The label matters little, but the general task
undertaken is simply described: to accommodate the newly initiated to the grandeur and rich complexity of the law and the legal
system without constraints imposed by the specific subject matter
of one traditional legal cubby hole. Professor Murphy's book suggests a fresh take-off for this introductory course. He singles out four
separate themes for consideration-Jurisdiction, A Cause of Action,
Statutory Interpretation, and Equity-and by thoughtful selection
and arrangement of opinions and notes that do speak to a first year
student, he makes a good case for his proposal.
1. Jurisdiction.The first section follows the traditional sequence
of jurisdiction cases used in most courses in civil procedure-in
personam jurisdiction through in rem jurisdiction and related concepts such as notice and attachment. Notes following each case not
only explore jurisdiction problems but attempt to develop in the
student technical skills required in law school. Otherwise, nothing
particularly noteworthy here. Like all books in print when the Supreme Court gave us Shaffer v. Heitner,' some reshuffling will be
needed to reflect the substantive changes. A question is necessarily
raised by Professor Murphy's treatment of jurisdiction: can the first
year curriculum afford to be twice blessed by jurisdiction? My belief
t Professor of Law, Duquesne University School of Law.
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is that it cannot, which leads to realignment possibilities that I shall
discuss below.
2. A Cause of Action. Under this guileless heading, Professor
Murphy challenges the student to take an in depth look at, and
firmly grasp, the manifold possibilities and perils of judicial lawmaking. First, he deals with the "Claim of Injury." In this subsection he probes the sense of "cause of action" or "claim" through the
leitmotif of a wife's only recently recognized claim for damages for
loss of her husband's consortium as a result of a defendant's negligence-the cause of action did not exist at common law.
With continuing interest, we are led through various state court
decisions that remain steadfast to the old rule, or, in one way or
another, open the door to full recognition of this new "claim" or
"cause -of action" at law. We see the impact of a groundbreaking
decision made in one state upon the case law of another, a halting
recognition of a need, a cautious "let's be sure" before we create
something where there was nothing before. Finally, we are shown
the impact of emerging constitutional considerations, imperfectly
formulated in equal protection terms, upon an eventual acceptance
of the new "claim."
The same motif of a wife's loss of consortium is used as transition
material to the next subsection, "Stability and Change." While we
see some courts backing off from formulating the new claim on
grounds that such new thrusts should be the legislature's work and
not the courts', others see no such barrier to judicial creativity. The
court-legislature frontier is further examined in the context of a
series of decisions on merely prospective overruling. One sees the
tremendous impetus given this recent device by the Supreme
Court's line of decisions commencing with Linkletter v. Walker' in
1965. This opinion is unfortunately omitted in favor of an ample
sampling of its Supreme Court sequelae. Again, the cases in this
subsection are selected with an eye to rich contrasts among state
courts. The final subsection combines "Joinder, Collateral Estoppel
and Res Judicata." The joinder material, another detachment from
(or supplement to) civil procedure, could well have been omitted.
But the case and note material on collateral estoppel and res judicata is choice, and most welcome, since this increasingly important
2.
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area frequently falls between our instructional chairs, or is hastily
treated at best.
3. Statutory Interpretation. An experienced contrast between
the law-making of the courts, and of the legislatures and administrators, is too rarely afforded first year law students. The individual
faculty member does his best as the occasion presents itself to make
the necessary points. However, we assume, rather than being sure,
that the student is sufficiently versed to do the job. Following his
stress on judicial ways in "A Cause of Action," Professor Murphy
sets out useful cases and notes on statutory interpretation. The
notes lack the analytical power of the memorable sections on statutory interpretation in the now classic Hart and Sacks materials,3 but
so do most later efforts. The basic tools and labels such as plain
meaning, text and context, purpose, legislative history, fair warning, ejusdem generis,' pari materia, and repeals by implication, are
given exposure through an interesting selection of cases. There are
familiar old favorites such as McBoyle v. United States' and
Caminetti v. United States,5 but largely there are fresh state court
cases. To examine a court's use of legislative history, many would
prefer Justice Harlan's dissent in Wesberry v. Sanders' to Justice
Stewart's tour de force in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.7 and Runyon
v. McCrary' (cases that will certainly be covered in constitutional
law). But these are tempting cases and one can't fault Professor
Murphy for finding them irresistible. Particularly suggestive is Justice Stevens' concurrence in Runyon, where he gives a nondoctrinaire account of his reasons for voting against his view of the meaning of the legislative history.
In a subsection on legislative intent, Professor Murphy quite ingeniously inserts some long arm statute cases, thus making a second
incision from civil procedure. Less helpful, in my view, is the inclusion of ad hoc decisions with no immediately apparent teaching
value such as Hamm v. City of Rock Hill' and the Amtrak Case."
3.
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But even these, on reflection, warn students that despite all assurances that there are canons of statutory interpretation, there remains the ever-present threat of judicial ad-hocness.
4. Equity. To this reader the best assortment was saved for last.
Professor Murphy fills a need I have long felt in first year curriculum
by collecting a choice sequence of cases that presents equity as a
living factor in current litigation. The familiar maxims are here, but
with the special twists that judicial craftsmen have lately given
them: how equity acts in personam (except when it acts in rem),
how its reach is limited to the home jurisdiction (except when it
reaches outside). He accents the familiar archways of equityfraud, harassment, grave wrong or oppression-and the barriers
and limitations to equitable relief, both judicially molded-adequate remedy at law, unclean hands, etc.-and constitutionally
fashioned-prior restraint, the mandated Freedman" procedures
in first amendment situations, and arguable jury trial issues. A
particularly incisive patch of cases on the equitable sanction of
contempt reminds the new law student that equity is not all peace
and light.
There are matters here that I would have handled differently, but
Professor Murphy's preferences are clearly defensible, and possibly
more rewarding than mine. For example, he gives what seems overlong consideration to the Younger v. Harris2 line of cases in his
subsection on equitable relief (47 pages, about one-half of the
subsection). As one who rarely gives these cases adequate space in
either constitutional law or federal jurisdiction, I should be perhaps
grateful to know the students will do them once, early and thoroughly. My reserve comes from feeling that the cases are more
rooted in concerns of federalism than in those of general equitable
relief.
Another subsection of the Equity chapter is called "Influence of
Moral Principles." The implication, never totally removed, is that
"equity" rather than "law" has a special claim on "moral principles." This gives more credence to a lingering positivism than many
of us are prepared to concede, especially when it develops that by
"moral principles" Professor Murphy intends largely overriding
ideas of justice and fairness in a nonconstitutional context. But the
11.
12.
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cases are apt and reassure one that these fears are overblown. In
fact, they make the point that in recent times the "law" has taken
responsibility for many "fairness" concepts previously rooted in
equity, e.g., unconscionability.
This book is well worth a try in any law school still unsatisfied
with its "introduction to law" course. For it to be fully used in its
present form, with the introductory chapter on jurisdiction, I think
general curriculum arrangements should be made detaching the
jurisdiction (including long arm statutes) material from the civil
procedure course. I am ready to propose this to my own faculty
(although as a civil procedure teacher I would agonize losing those
cases on jurisdiction). On the other hand, the book seems valuable
on its Cause of Action, Statutory Interpretation, and Equity chapters alone. True, later sections refer back to the jurisdiction material. But by that time students could certainly have absorbed the
same cases in their civil procedure course. Either way, I believe, it
flies.
Albert Broderick*
* Professor of Law, North Carolina Central University.

